Abu Hatem أبو حاتم

Congress, Bush, Compromise, and Kendall’s “Two Majorities”

Writing by abuhatem on Friday, 14 of March , 2008 at 4:43 am

Being that there is a Presidential election going on, I decided to go back and brush up on some Democratic theory. An interest in the Congress has kindled in me in the past few days following viewing the political battles between them and the Presidency. I have always been fascinated by one major aspect of democracy - compromise amongst competing interests. Robert Dahl wrote a controversial but interesting novel take on this in his work Polyarchy, and James Madison lays its foundations out in The Federalist 10. I took out two very interesting works to try to understand this concept of compromise - Gould’s very recent history of the senate: The Most Exclusive Club, and American majoritarian scholar Willmore Kendall’s work The Two Majorities. Kendall died in the mid-1960s yet his work is as important today as ever. Very, very little has been written about Kendall’s work which today is largely forgotten thus I hope that my blog entry can provide a little re-introduction and re-discovery of his literature which applies to our modern day. Kendall said and believed many things which I do not agree with, yet I find his Two Majorities to be his most useful work.

The Presidential elections in Lebanon are an example of the problem of compromise in democracy, particularly two of its forms - the Presidential or hybrid Presidential-Parliamentary systems. Lebanon’s original constitution was based in a hybrid system of France which combined the parliamentary system (Britain, Germany, etc.) and the Presidential system (United States, Latin America) to create a strong executive President coupled with a significantly powerful parliament.

The Lebanese system consists of a popularly elected parliament which has the power to create legislation. The parliament also elects a President through an election of 2/3rds which usually involves a compromise on a specific candidate. The President serves 6 year terms. The President’s main power is to appoint or veto a Prime Minister offered by the parliament. The Prime Minister is the most powerful member of the government and generally controls the agenda of public policy in the country. Prime Ministers, as in any parliamentary system, come from the majority party or ruling coalition’s ranks.

The problem is the Lebanon has been deadlocked and not elected a President for over 7 months now because nobody can compromise enough to agree on a candidate. And this is where a “compromise” aspect of democracy fails and leads to what ironically the French called imobilisme, a stalemate in government.

Another example of the “compromise” aspect of democratic theory can be seen in France. In French politics there is a concept of cohabitation which is when the President - who is popularly elected - is of one party while the parliament (and thus the Prime Minister) is of another. During these periods in French politics, the Prime Minister basically controls all domestic policy while the President controls foreign policy. It is interesting to note that the French have now allowed their legislative elections to coincide with their Presidential elections to avoid this.

In the United States, a full Presidential system, there is one major case of “compromise” in democracy. This is when the Congress is controlled by one party while the Presidency is controlled by another. Modern realizations of this are in the present 2006-elected Congress led by Democratic speaker Nancy Pelosi as opposed to the Republican executive branch of President George W. Bush. In the previous Presidency of Bill Clinton this ocurred after the 1994 “Republican revolution” which had Democratic President Bill Clinton and Republican House speaker Newt Gingrich at odds.

Parliamentary democracies, such as the United Kingdom, do not face such periods of “compromise.” Under the British system of “fusion of powers,” the majority party in parliament and thus the Prime Minister and his cabinet, control the entire government. They can essentially pass what they need to pass and there is little need for “compromise” until legislative elections occur.

Therefore two main questions occur in this comparison amongst systems - why is the American system rooted in a compromise based separation of powers, and what have modern gridlocked government’s accomplished? Willmoore Kendall’s work answers the first with beautiful exposition and defense of the founding fathers. And during this Presidential election year, they are extremely pertinent to discussion.

Kendall asks the question, why does the same majority of voters who elects a President then elect a Congress which completely opposes him? The same voters who desire the high minded ideals which each candidate offers them in the Presidential election simultaneously elect a Congress - even if it is of the same party - which is skeptical and opposes the President. The control of Congress and the control of the Presidency are what Kendall calls “the two majorities.”

Kendall argues that the Founders believed in majority rule (with minority rights - the essence of classical liberalism, but I will write about those and the marriage of classical liberalism and democracy in a later post). Yet they understood that popular sentiment could consist in short bursts of popular support which fade quickly. Thus they spread out the elections of Congress which would exist both at the beginning of and the middle of a President’s terms. They also spread about the election of Senators and made their terms six years long so that they would not be affected by bursts of popular sentiment.

Kendall argues that the Congress is essentially the embodiment of an aristocracy of elites in the American system. The Senate and House have their roles and structures and their organizations of leadership. There are also many differences within the Congress itself. There is the House which is essentially a reflection of current popular sentiment being up for election every two years, but then there is the Senate which was created to represent states and originally elected by state legislatures and in much slower spurts of 33% every 2 years. The Senate itself is very undemocratic, there is the filibuster which can destroy legislation which is not supported by a super majority of 60 votes. All of this causes many unnecessary problems in attempting to create law - and by extention policy.

Yet Kendall argues that the creation of the institution of the Congress was ingenious and believes as the founders did that it should be the most powerful branch of government. Kendall rejects removing the filibuster, or ceding power to the executive branch as most called for at his time. Kendall also rejects Dahl’s argument that the Congress should be a “polyarchy” of deliberations by informed representatives of the people which led to a compromise which gave “a little bit to everyone.” Instead Kendall states that the Congress’ tensions with the Presidency is the most healthy aspect of American democracy, that the “two majorities” highlight an essential aspect of the American system of “majority rule” which he calls — the intensity problem.

The intensity problem in democracy is that although the popular collective majority will may intend the enactment of certain policies, some policies are more important and more supported than others. Thus different elected officials, whether the President or Congressman, may have a list of objectives they want to pass with some more important than others. An opinion which is so intense that it causes the “two majorities” to concur through elections which are broken up by long 2 year breaks are deeply held by the public and are thus “intense majorities” which should get their will. Opinions which are not as intense, meaning their majorities fluctuate throughout differing elections creating no clear strong consensus of the “two majorities” will be defeated in Congress or vetoed by the President.

Because the Congress is formed by two distinct institutions - the House of Representatives and the Senate - which must agree and compromise on a final version of their bill, this further insures that the policies which are passed are of intense majorities. The Senate also compromise in crafting their version of a bill if faced by a minority of 41 to 50 which may filibuster a bill if they feel strong in their intensity of opposition to a Bill (a filibuster can be stopped by a 60-40 supermajority). George Washington told Thomas Jefferson that the Senate was created to “watch over” the House, making sure that the laws passed were not simply fading bursts of popular sentiment.

After the House, and Senate compromise on a bill which is supported by a strong enough intensity majority will that it is agreed upon by both bodies, the President must sign it. And if the President, also elected by popular will, does not like the bill it will fail unless the intensity of the Congressional majority is so strong to be overwhelming with a 2/3rds over ride. And thus there exists another aspect of compromise.

A modern example can be the war in Iraq. The same American public who elected a Republican President and Congress in 2004, then supported a Democratic Congress against the war in 2006. However, because the Presidency was controlled by an opposing party the majority will is not intense enough to be “long lasting” in its nature unless a Democratic President is elected in 2008 in which the policy will be enacted.

And it appears the Democrats are going to not only take the Congress next time, but the Senate by perhaps 60 votes. Such an intense majority will be a mandate for change unseen of since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt who altered American public policy in the most rapid period in the history of the United States. But for now, the gridlock which confronts our government is not so bad after all - because two-party compromise is the essential feature of our Republic.

It is interesting that Clinton and Gingrich, bitter rivals, accomplished more together for both sides than Clinton did with a Democratic Congress or the Republican Congress would do with George W. Bush. The late Milton Friedman said before he died that the best type of governments always occurred in the United States under a gridlocked President and Congress. Or as Lord Acton said “absolute power corrupts absolutely.” An Obama with a Republican Congress down the line would be a more conservative - yet compromising - government than Bush and the Republicans ever accomplished.

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Muslim American commentary on politics, political philosophy, international relations, conservatism, and economics.